Comments due by Oct. 14, 2018
SWEDEN’S parliament passed a law in June which obliges the
country to have “no net emissions” of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere by
2045. The clue is in the wording. This does not mean that three decades from
now Swedes must emit no planet-heating substances; even if all their
electricity came from renewables and they only drove Teslas, they would
presumably still want to fly in aeroplanes, or use cement and fertiliser, the
making of which releases plenty of carbon dioxide. Indeed, the law only
requires gross emissions to drop by 85% compared with 1990 levels. But it
demands that remaining carbon sources are offset with new carbon sinks. In
other words greenhouse gases will need to be extracted from the air.
Sweden’s pledge is among the world’s most ambitious. But if the
global temperature is to have a good chance of not rising more than 2ºC above
its pre-industrial level, as stipulated in the Paris climate agreement of 2015,
worldwide emissions must similarly hit “net zero” no later than 2090. After
that, emissions must go “net negative”, with more carbon removed from the stock
than is emitted.
This is because what matters to the climate is the total amount
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. To keep the temperature below a certain
level means keeping within a certain “carbon budget”—allowing only so much to
accumulate, and no more. Once you have spent that budget, you have to balance
all new emissions with removals. If you overspend it, the fact that the world
takes time to warm up means you have a brief opportunity to put things right by
taking out more than you are putting in.
Being able to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is,
therefore, a crucial element in meeting climate targets. Of the 116 models the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) looks at to chart the
economically optimal paths to the Paris goal, 101 assume “negative emissions”.
No scenarios are at all likely to keep warming under 1.5ºC without
greenhouse-gas removal. “It is built into the assumptions of the Paris
agreement,” says Gideon Henderson of Oxford University.
Climate scientists like Mr Henderson have been discussing
negative-emissions technologies (NETs) with economists and policy wonks since
the 1990s. Their debate has turned livelier since the Paris agreement, the
phrasing of which strongly suggests that countries will need to invent new
sinks as well as cutting emissions. But so far politicians have largely ignored
the issue, preferring to focus on curbing current flows of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere. NETs were conspicuous by their absence from the agenda of
the annual UN climate jamboree which ended in Bonn on November 17th.
In the short term this makes sense. The marginal cost of
reducing emissions is currently far lower than the marginal cost of taking
carbon dioxide straight from the atmosphere. But climate is not a short-term
game. And in the long term, ignoring the need for negative emissions is
complacent at best. The eventual undertaking, after all, will be gargantuan.
The median IPCC model assumes sucking up a total of 810bn tonnes of carbon
dioxide by 2100, equivalent to roughly 20 years of global emissions at the
current rate. To have any hope of doing so, preparations for large-scale
extraction ought to begin in the 2020s.
Modellers favour NETs that use plants because they are a tried
and true technology. Reforesting logged areas or “afforesting” previously
treeless ones presents no great technical challenges. More controversially,
they also tend to invoke “bioenergy with carbon capture and storage” (BECCS).
In BECCS, power stations fuelled by crops that can be burned to make energy
have their carbon-dioxide emissions injected into deep geological strata,
rather than released into the atmosphere.
The technology for doing the CCS part of BECCS has been around
for a while; some scenarios for future energy generation rely heavily on it.
But so far there are only 17 CCS programmes big enough to dispose of around 1m
tonnes of carbon dioxide a year. Promoting CCS is an uphill struggle, mainly
because it doubles the cost of energy from the dirty power plants whose flues
it scrubs. Other forms of low-emission electricity are much cheaper. Affixed to
bioenergy generation, though, CCS does something that other forms of generation
cannot. The carbon which the plants that serve as fuel originally took from the
atmosphere above is sent into the rocks below, making it a negative emitter.
The problem with afforestation and BECCS is that the plants
involved need a huge amount of land. The area estimated ranges from 3.2m square
kilometres (roughly the size of India) to as much as 9.7m square kilometres
(roughly the size of Canada). That is the equivalent of between 23% and 68% of
the world’s arable land. It may be that future agricultural yields can be
increased so dramatically that, even in a world with at least 2bn more mouths
to feed, the area of its farms could be halved, and that the farmers involved
might be happy with this turn of events. But it seems highly unlikely—and
blithely assuming it can be done is plainly reckless.
Negative thinking
Less
land-intensive alternatives exist—at least on paper. Some are low tech, like
stimulating the soil to store more carbon by limiting or halting
deep-ploughing. Others are less so, such as contraptions to seize carbon
dioxide directly from the air, or methods that accelerate the natural
weathering processes by which minerals in the Earth’s crust bind atmospheric
carbon over aeons or that introduce alkaline compounds into the sea to make it
absorb more carbon dioxide.
According to Jennifer Wilcox of the Colorado School of Mines,
and her colleagues, the technology with the second-highest theoretical
potential, after BECCS, is direct air capture (see chart 2). This uses CCS-like
technology on the open air, rather than on exhaust gases. The problem is that
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the air, while very high by historical
standards, is very low by chemical-engineering ones: just 0.04%, as opposed to
the 10% or more offered by power-plant chimneys and industrial processes such
as cement-making.
The technologies that exist today, under development by
companies such as Global Thermostat in America, Carbon Engineering in Canada or
Climeworks of Switzerland, remain pricey. In 2011 a review by the American
Physical Society to which Ms Wilcox contributed put extraction costs above $600
per tonne, compared with an average estimate of $60-250 for BECCS.
Enhanced weathering is at an even earlier stage of development
and costs are still harder to assess. Estimates range from $25 per tonne of
carbon dioxide to $600. On average, 2-4 tonnes of silicate minerals (olivine,
sometimes used in Finnish saunas because it withstands repeated heating and
cooling, is a favourite) are needed for every tonne removed. To extract 5bn
tonnes of carbon dioxide a year may require up to 20bn tonnes of minerals that
must be ground into fine dust. Grinding is energy-intensive. Distributing the
powder evenly, on land or sea, would be a logistical challenge to put it
mildly.
Ideas abound on a small scale, in labs or in researchers’ heads,
but the bigger mechanical schemes in existence today capture a paltry 40m
tonnes of carbon dioxide a year. Most involve CCS and have prevented more
carbon dioxide escaping into the atmosphere from fossil-burning power plants,
rather than removing it. Removing 8bn-10bn tonnes by 2050, as the more sanguine
scenarios envisage, let alone the 35bn-40bn tonnes in more pessimistic ones,
will be a vast undertaking.
Progress will be needed on many fronts. All the more reason to
test lots of technologies. For the time being even researchers with a horse in
the race are unwilling to bet on a winner. Pete Smith of Aberdeen University
speaks for many NETs experts when he says that “none is a silver bullet, and
none has a fatal flaw.”
It will also not come cheap. WITCH, constructed by Massimo
Tavoni of Politecnico di Milano, is a model which analyses climate scenarios.
Unlike most simulations, it also estimates how much research-and-development
funding is necessary to achieve roll-out at the sort of scale these models
forecast. For all low-carbon technologies, it puts the figure at $65bn a year
until 2050, four times the sum that renewables, batteries and the like attract
today. Mr Tavoni says a chunk of that would obviously need to go to NETs, which
currently get next to nothing.
Even the less speculative technologies need investment right
away. Trees take decades to reach their carbon-sucking potential, so
large-scale planting needs to start soon, notes Tim Searchinger of Princeton
University. Direct air capture in particular looks expensive. Boosters note
that a few years ago so did renewables. Before technological progress brought
prices down, many countries subsidised renewable-energy sources to the tune of
$500 per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided and often spent huge sums on it.
Christoph Gebald, co-founder of Climeworks, says that “the first data point on
our technological learning curve” is $600, at the lower end of previous
estimates. But like the price of solar panels, he expects his costs to drop in
the coming years, perhaps to as low as $100 per tonne.
However, the falling price of solar panels was a result of
surging production volumes, which NETs will struggle to replicate. As Oliver
Geden of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs observes,
“You cannot tell the green-growth story with negative emissions.” A market
exists for rooftop solar panels and electric vehicles; one for removing an
invisible gas from the air to avert disaster decades from now does not.
Much of the gas captured by Climeworks and other pure NETs firms
(as opposed to fossil-fuel CCS) is sold to makers of fizzy drinks or
greenhouses to help plants grow. It is hard to imagine that market growing far
beyond today’s total of 10m tonnes. And in neither case is the gas stored indefinitely.
It is either burped out by consumers of carbonated drinks or otherwise exuded
by eaters of greenhouse-grown produce.
There may be other markets, though. It is very hard to imagine
aircraft operating without liquid fuels. One way to provide them would be to
create them chemically using carbon dioxide taken from the atmosphere. It is
conceivable that this might be cheaper than alternatives, such as
biofuels—especially if the full environmental impact of the biofuels is
accounted for. The demand for direct air capture spurred by such a market might
drive its costs low enough to make it a more plausible NET.
From thin air
One way to
create a market for NETs would be for governments to put a price on carbon.
Where they have done so, the technologies have been adopted. Take Norway, which
in 1991 told oil firms drilling in the North Sea to capture carbon dioxide from
their operations or pay up. This cost is now around $50 per tonne emitted; in
one field, called Sleipner, the firms have found ways to pump it back
underground for less than that. A broader carbon price—either a tax or tradable
emissions permits—would promote negative emissions elsewhere, too.
Then there is the issue of who should foot the bill. Many
high-impact negative-emissions schemes make most sense in low-emitting
countries, says Ms Wilcox. Brazil could in theory reforest the cerrado (though
that would face resistance because of the region’s role in growing soyabeans
and beef). Countries of sub-Saharan Africa could do the same in their own
tropical savannahs. Spreading olivine in the Amazon and Congo river basins
could soak up 2bn tonnes of carbon dioxide.
Developing countries would be understandably loth to bankroll
any of this to tackle cumulative emissions, most of which come from the rich
world. The latter would doubtless recoil at footing the bill, preferring to
concentrate on curbing current emissions in the mistaken belief that once these
reach zero, the job is done.
Whether NETs deserve to be lumped in with more outlandish
“geoengineering” proposals, such as cooling the Earth with sunlight-reflecting
sulphur particles in the stratosphere, is much debated. What they have in
common is that they offer ways to deal with the effects of emissions that have
already taken place. Proponents of small-scale, low-impact NETs, such as
changes to soil management on farms, though, bridle at being considered
alongside what they see as high-tech hubris of the most disturbing kind. NETs
certainly inspire fewer fears of catastrophic, planetary-scale side-effects
than “solar radiation management”.
But they do stoke some when it comes to the consequences of
tinkering with the ocean’s alkalinity or injecting large amounts of gas
underground. And the direct effects of large-scale BECCS or afforestation
projects would be huge. If they don’t take up arable land, they need to take up
pasture or wilderness. Either option would be a big deal in terms of both human
amenity and biodiversity.
Another concern is the impact on politicians and the dangers of
moral hazard. NETs allow politicians to go easy on emission cuts now in the
hope that a quick fix will appear in the future. This could prove costly if the
technology works—and costlier still if it does not. One study found that
following a 2°C mitigation path which takes for granted NETs that fail to
materialise would leave the world closer to 3°C warmer. Mr Geden is not alone
in fearing that models that increasingly rely on NETs are “a cover for
political inaction”.
Everything and the carbon sink
There is some
progress. Academics are paying more attention. This year’s edition of
“Emissions Gap”, an influential annual report from the UN Environment
Programme, devotes a chapter to carbon-dioxide removal. Mr Henderson is leading
a study of the subject for Britain’s Royal Society; America’s National Academy
of Sciences has commissioned one, too. Both are due next spring. The IPCC will
look at the technology in its special report on the 1.5ºC target, due next
autumn.
There’s some money, too. Carbon Engineering has attracted
backers such as Bill Gates, and now has a pilot plant in Canada. Climeworks has
actually sold some carbon-offset credits—to a private investor and a big
corporation—on the basis of the carbon dioxide it has squirrelled away at a
demonstration plant it recently launched in Iceland. Earlier this year
Britain’s government became the first to set aside some cash specifically for NETs
research. In October America’s Department of Energy announced a series of
grants for “novel and enabling” carbon-capture technologies, some of which
could help in the development of schemes for direct air capture. Richard
Branson, a British tycoon, has offered $25m to whoever first comes up with a
“commercially viable design” that would remove 1bn tonnes of greenhouse gases a
year for ten years.
All this is welcome, but not enough. The sums involved are
trifling: £8.6m ($11.3m) in Britain and $26m from the Department of Energy. The
offset sold by Climeworks was for just 100 tonnes. Mr Branson’s prize has gone
unclaimed for a decade.
A carbon price—which is a good idea for other reasons, too,
would beef up interest in NETs. But one high enough to encourage pricey
moonshots may prove too onerous for the rest of the economy. Any price would
promote more established low-carbon technologies first and NETs only much
later, thinks Glen Peters of the Centre for International Climate Research in
Oslo.
Encouraging CCS for fossil fuels as a stepping stone to NETs
appeals to some. The fossil-fuel industry says it is committed to the
technology. Total, a French oil giant, has promised to spend a tenth of its
$600m research budget on CCS and related technologies. A group of oil majors
says it will spend up to $500m on similar projects between now and 2027. But
the field’s slow progress to date hardly encourages optimism. Governments’
commitment to CCS has historically proved fickle.
Last year Britain abruptly scrapped a £1bn public grant for an
industrial-scale CCS plant which would have helped fine-tune the technology.
For this to change, politicians must expand the focus of the 23-year-old UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change from cutting emissions of greenhouse
gases to controlling their airborne concentrations, suggests Janos Pasztor, a
former climate adviser to the UN secretary-general. In other words, they must
think about stocks of carbon dioxide, not just flows.
This is all the more true because emissions continue to elude
control. After three years of more or less stable emissions, a zippier world
economy looks on track to belch 2% more carbon dioxide this year. That amounts
once again to borrowing more of the planet’s remaining carbon budget against
future removal. It doesn’t take a numerate modeller like Mr Tavoni to grasp
that, in his words, “If you create a debt, you must repay it.” The price of
default does not bear thinking about. (Economist Nov. 2017)